英语翻译The aim of chapter 2 is to fill some of the gaps present in existing studies.Starting from the hypothesis that observed regime discrepancies are systematic,i.e.,not the result of random policy errors,it provides evidence for the existence

英语翻译The aim of chapter 2 is to fill some of the gaps present in existing studies.Starting from the hypothesis that observed regime discrepancies are systematic,i.e.,not the result of random policy errors,it provides evidence for the existence
英语翻译
The aim of chapter 2 is to fill some of the gaps present in existing studies.Starting from the hypothesis that observed regime discrepancies are systematic,i.e.,not the result of random policy errors,it provides evidence for the existence of systematic elements in observed regime discrepancies by linking them to specific country characteristics.The main empirical finding is that countries tend to communicate exchange rate regimes at
the corners of the flexibility spectrum,i.e.,either fixed or flexible regimes,but to operate intermediate regimes.Whether countries announce a fixed or flexible exchange
rate depends on country characteristics,in particular related to trade structure,financial development,and financial openness.Also,countries at different stages of economic
and financial development differ in the nature of regime discrepancies.Finally,the
decreasing frequency of countries managing their exchange rate less than announced and the increasing occurrence of countries intervening more than announced align with
broader economic trends and developments worldwide related to financial globalization and changes in monetary policy design.
The separation of communication and implementation of exchange rate policy may provide policymakers with an additional tool to tackle challenges from financial globalization.
In an era of high financial integration and capital mobility,countries may not be restrained to choose between pursuing an independent monetary policy and stable exchange
rates while refraining from capital controls.For numerous countries the optimal policy may be neither of the two extremes but a combination.However,as intermediate
exchange rate regimes are difficult to communicate,see,e.g.,Frankel,Fajnzylber,Schmukler and Serven (2001),countries may find it optimal to use exchange rate regime
announcements and a diverging implementation as a second best policy.The empirical patterns point at the role of monetary policy within the macroeconomic policy trilemma.Especially emerging market economies that adopted inflation targeting
and,hence,announce flexible exchange rates,manage their exchange rate more than announced.This is not surprising as the exchange rate is one,if not the most important price in an open economy.As small open economies steadily move away from fixed 1Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Uli Klüh.

英语翻译The aim of chapter 2 is to fill some of the gaps present in existing studies.Starting from the hypothesis that observed regime discrepancies are systematic,i.e.,not the result of random policy errors,it provides evidence for the existence
第2章的目标将填补某些空白当前在现有的研究中.从假说开始被观察的政权差误是系统的,即,任意政策错误的不是结果,它为系统的元素的存在被观察的政权差误提供证据通过连接他们给具体国家特征.主要经验主义发现是国家倾向于传达交换率政权在灵活性光谱,即,固定的或灵活的政权的角落,但操作中间政权.国家是否宣布固定或浮动汇率取决于国家特征,特别是与商业结构、财政发展和财政开放性有关.并且,国家在经济和财政发展不同的阶段必然政权差误不同.终于,处理他们的交换率的国家越来越少的频率较不比宣布和国家增长的发生干预更比宣布与更加宽广的经济趋势排列,并且发展全世界与在货币政策上的财政全球化和变化有关设计.交换率政策的通信和实施的分离也许提供政府决策人员以一个另外的工具给滑车挑战从财政全球化.在高财政综合化和资本流动性时代,国家不可以被克制选择在追求独立货币政策和稳定的交换率之间,当克制资本控制时.为许多国家最优策略也许是两者都不二个极端,但组合.然而,因为中间交换率政权是难沟通,看见,即,Frankel、Fajnzylber、Schmukler和Serven (2001),国家可以发现它优选使用交换率政权公告和分流的实施作为第二个最佳政策.经验主义的样式在宏观经济政策trilemma之内指向货币政策的角色.特别是采取通货膨胀瞄准,并且,因此,宣布浮动汇率的新兴市场经济,处理他们的交换率更比宣布.这不惊奇,因为交换率是一个,如果不最重要的价格在开放经济.小开放经济从固定的1Chapter 2平稳地移动根据联合工作与Uli Klüh.